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4

Outline
I introduce a fairly simple distinction about one way to divide up truth claims. That is to
say, I propose that claims can be divided up into one of two disjoint sets. The goal of
this project is not to argue in favor of that distinction per se, but to consider our
distinction’s implication in comparison to other similar distinctions.

The distinction I propose is that one way we can divide up claims, is into the set
of “claims about physical things” and into the set of “claims about non-physical things”
and that those two sets of possible claims will be disjoint.

Obviously, our distinction requires further definition but the distinction itself is
fairly simple. Most of our discussion will be spent considering the implications of our
distinction and comparing the implications to those of similar distinctions, namely with
the distinction between meaningful claims and meaningless claims put forward by Ayer
in Language Truth and Logic.

In what way is our distinction similar to Ayer’s distinction and in what way is our
1

distinction different than Ayer’s distinction? Are there conditions under which Ayer’s

1

By conditions under which Ayer’s distinction will be more similar to our own, I refer to Ayer’s definition of
rationality. Given Ayer’s definition of rationality it might follow that Ayer’s distinction (between meaningful
and meaningless beliefs) will be applied differently depending on which standards of belief formation one
considers to be reliable.
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distinction will be more or less similar to our own? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of Ayer’s distinction in comparison to our own?

These are the kinds of questions we will try to answer. There are two main ways
we will compare and contrast our distinction with Ayer’s distinction.

By “compare and contrast” I mean firstly to compare how other distinctions divide
up a set of claims into two disjoint sets of claims2.

The second way that we will compare our distinction to that of Ayer is by
examining the other philosophical commitments presumed in our distinction. When you
stake out an area around one philosophical position you are often, both implicitly and
explicitly, making claims about other philosophical positions simply as a necessary
consequence of your initial claim. So does our proposed distinction force us to take
positions we don’t want to take? How do the presumed commitments of our distinction
compare to the commitments of Ayer’s distinction?

The actual chapters of our paper will proceed as follows.

2

As we’ve said, our distinction divides up claims into two groups. We can similarly use Ayer’s distinction
to divide up potential claims into two groups. So then, we examine how the membership of the two groups
of claims produced by our distinction compares to the two groups of claims produced by Ayer’s
distinction.
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In the first chapter we will introduce our claim.

In the second chapter we introduce a major problem for our claim, the apparent
presumption a mind independent external world. We introduce Chalmers’s claims about
“realness” in the case that we are inside of a simulation. We point out some
disagreements we have with Chalmers but eventually we use Chalmers’s argument to
resolve our problem. We explain why our claim does not presume the existence of a
mind independent external world.

In the third chapter we introduce Ayer’s distinction between meaningful and
meaningless claims. We point out that, with the exception of tautological claims, Ayer
will seemingly divide up claims the same way that we will divide them up. That is we will
both divide up a set of claims into two identical sets. We call this similarity the ‘similarity
of division’.

In the fourth chapter we reexamine the ‘similarity of division’. We take a closer
look at Ayer’s use of ‘probability’ and ‘rationality’. We then present a case where, given
Ayer’s specific usage of ‘probability’, the similarity of division will not hold.

In the fifth chapter we review the paper and suggest some points for further
discussion.

7
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Chapter 1: an introduction to our distinction.

Some claims are about the physical world; we call these claims about the physical world
“physical claims”. Other claims are not about the physical world; these are nonphysical
claims.

We say that a physical claim is a claim about the world itself whereas a
non-physical claim is only about the way we categorize things in our minds and not
about the world itself.

Defining the key terms
What exactly do we mean by “claims about the physical world”; what are these
“physical claims”? Let’s begin by introducing the criteria for “physical claims”.

The criteria for a “physical claim” is any claim where the world will itself be
different corresponding to the truth value of the claim. That is, supposing two possible
worlds, one for each of a claim’s two possible truth values, the world where the claim is
true will itself be different from the world where the claim is false.

9

So then, a physical claim is one where each of the truth values of the claim
corresponds to different possible worlds.

To determine if a claim is a physical claim we need only ask ourselves “will there
be some difference in the world itself corresponding to the truth value of the claim”. If
the answer to that question is “yes”, that a world where the claim is true will itself be
different than a world where the claim is false, then we say that the claim is a physical
claim. If the answer to that question is no, that a world then the claim is true will not
itself be different based on the truth value of the claim, then the claim is a nonphysical
claim.

Our explanation of our distinction and the criterion behind it aren’t even close to
clear enough. We need some examples.

Some examples to illustrate our distinction.
(1) : “there is a chair over there”

To determine whether this claim is a physical claim we will simply ask, for this
claim about the location of a chair, “will a world where this claim is true look different
than a world where this claim is false”.
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Yes! It would appear that a world where the claim is true will in fact look different
than a world where the claim is false. In a world where the claim is true there will be a
chair at the specified location. In a world where the claim is false there won’t be a chair
3

at the specified location . There will in short be a difference in the placement of at least
one chair corresponding to the truth value of the claim: there will in this case be a
difference in the world corresponding to the truth value of the claim.

So then, because there is a difference in the world itself corresponding to each
truth value of the claim it would follow that the claim is a physical claim. So then we can
say that (1) was a physical claim. Let’s move on to another example.

(2): “killing puppies is evil”

Again, to determine whether this claim is a physical claim we need only to ask,
“will a world where this claim is true look different than a world where this claim is false”.
Let’s consider what the world will look like corresponding to the two possible truth
values of (2).

3

There is some stuff going unsaid. For example, we assume competent language speakers. Likewise we
assume that when two competent language speakers disagree about whether there is a chair over there
they are disagreeing about an observable matter of fact and not about the definition of “chair” or “there”.
That is to say that claims like “there is a chair over there” are true in the case of a there being a chair but
false in the case of there not being a chair.
In comparison a disagreement over whether “evil” exists in the world doesn’t hinge on something
observable in the world. That two competent language speakers disagree about such a claim isn’t about
something in the world but about how the category “evil” is applied. That is to say that the truth value of
claim about the existence of evil (again between language speakers) doesn’t hinge on something in the
world itself.
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In a world where the second exemplar claim is false I will categorize the act of
killing a puppy as non-evil. That is, I will mentally categorize the action of killing a puppy
as non-evil.

What will a world where the second claim is true look like? In a world where the
claim is true I will categorize the act of killing a puppy as evil.

Nothing in the world itself changes based on the truth value of this second
exemplar claim. When two people argue about the truth value of this claim they aren’t
(in most cases) arguing about something in the world itself but about what things fall
into the mental category of evil. Because there is no difference in the world itself
corresponding to the truth value of the second claim we say that the second claim is not
a physical claim. The second claim is a claim about non-physical things, or a
non-physical claim.

The application of our criterion is simple. To determine if a given claim is a claim
about physical things, or a claim about nonphysical things we need only to answer two
questions and then make a single comparison. We must ask “what will a world where
this claim is true look like” and “what will a world where this claim is false look like”.
From there we need only compare the responses of the two questions. If the responses
to both questions is the same, that is to say that there will be no difference in the world
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corresponding to the truth value of the claim, then the claim is a claim about
nonphysical things. If however the response to both questions is different, that is that
there is some difference in the world corresponding to each of the two truth value, then
the claim is a claim about physical things.

Some more kinds of physical claims

There are two more kinds of physical claims that should at least be mentioned
here. For the time being we will not apply our criteria to these two kinds of physical
claims. That will have to wait for the end of the project. What we will do though is
introduce each of the two kinds of case with an exemplar case and briefly explain how
these two cases are different than our first exemplar case with the chair. Again, the
application of our criteria to these two cases will come at the end of the project. Our
goal here is merely to acknowledge the existence of these two major categories of
physical claim without immediately jumping into them.

Claims about universal laws such as claims about gravity
(3) Any claim about gravity for example. That is to say any claim about a
universal law. That a world where a certain claim about gravity is true will itself be
different than a world where that claim about gravity is false seems obvious enough at
first. If the claim is false, I don’t know, people start floating around. If the claim is true
then things go on as usual. Of course though, things aren’t that simple. For example
suppose some understanding of gravity makes lots of accurate predictions but makes a
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single incorrect prediction. Do we dispose of the theory or do we assume auxiliary
hypothesis which are consistent with the theory?

Whereas the application of our criterion in the chair case was seeming simple,
the application of our criterion is more difficult in the gravity case. That is to say that it’s
difficult to approximate what the world would look like for each of a universal claim’s
truth values.

I should point out that we are not in any way claiming that there are in fact any
such universal laws. We are merely acknowledging that universal laws such as gravity
might exist, and that if they did in fact exist, that claims about universal laws would be
claims about physical things.

The application of our criterion to such cases will be a challenge. However, as I
said, we will deal with that towards the end of our project. Let’s quickly look at the final
case. The final case will be claims like:

(4) “mammals are particularly sensitive to aversive stimulus related to things that
they eat”.

In case (4) we propose a kind of rule, but with (4) unlike with (3) the rule is less
stringent: the rule is only a general rule but that there are exceptions to the rule. That is
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for example, the truth value of the hypothesis clearly isn’t contingent on any specific
event in the world. For example suppose the following case:

● I drink some Coca Cola
● I become violently ill
● This happens multiple times
● I then later drink Coca Cola, again I sense no aversion, I have no Gag
reflex etc.

Surely in such a case we would all agree that we have not falsified (4). In other
words, (4) expresses a rather uncontroversial claim. However, there is no single event,
or even reasonably small sets of events that could falsify that claim. So then the
question becomes, how would a world where (4) is true look different than a world
where (4) is false?

We will wait until we have dealt with Ayer to examine these last two kinds of
claims. Put simply according to Ayer the problems of (3) and (4) are equally applicable
to (1). That is according to Ayer, no claim can ever be conclusively verified or falsified.
We agree with Ayer on this point. In fact we take it a step further and claim that even
tautologies can never have their truth values conclusively settled.
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Given then that claim by Ayer, a claim which we agree with, the problems of (3)
and (4) will be equally applicable to (1), and to all physical claims. That is, we will see
that there is no way to conclusively verify or falsify a physical claim.

Right now we have a more pressing contradiction to deal with: our apparent
presumption of mind independent external worlds.
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Chapter 2: the mind independent external world
Before we can go on there is one problem that must be dealt with; it is the
philosophical elephant in the room. The problem is, it would seem, that our distinction
presumes the existence of a mind independent external world.

In our description of the two kinds of claims we seem to be presuming the
existence of a mind independent world. After all we do say that claims about physical
things are claims about the world itself; however, in the case of claims about
nonphysical things we say that the claim is not about the world itself, rather that it is
merely a claim about how we mentally categorize things in our mind.

So then it would seem to follow from the explanation of our distinction that
physical things exist in the world itself. Conversely it would likewise seem to follow that
non-physical things don’t exist in the world itself, but only exist in our minds. In other
words, it seems to follow from our distinction that things that exist in the world itself are
different than things that exist in our mind. In other words, we seem to be indirectly
saying that things which exist in the world itself exist outside of our minds. We seem to
by implying that the physical world exists outside of our mind. We seem to be
presuming the existence of a mind independent external world.
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So what? Say that our distinction does in fact presume the existence of a mind
independent external world, is that really a problem? Yes.

The problem with supposing the existence of a mind independent external world
is that doing so would, firstly, force us to take a position on heavily contested
philosophical ground. Now, that would be acceptable if we had some knock down
argument in favor of the existence of a mind independent external world. We don’t have
any such argument. And so taking a strong position in such an uncertain area without
any strong auxiliary arguments would be a bad argumentative move. Put simply we
don’t want our argument to hinge on a single contentious claim for which we have no
supporting argument.

Additionally, I wouldn’t even be asking you to take my word for it without a
supporting argument. I have no clue if there is a mind independent external world; it
would take me awhile to work out if “mind independent world” is even a meaningful
concept. I don’t want to stake our project’s claim on a single auxiliary claim which may
or may not even mean something. If we want out distinction to be even slightly plausible
we need to separate our distinction from claims about mind independent external
worlds.
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Mind independent external world
Of course, as you might have guessed, our claim doesn’t actually imply the
existence of a mind independent external world. Our claim is in fact totally neutral on all
questions of mind independent external worlds; to explain why we need to borrow an
argument from Chalmers.

Chalmers

Prima facie it seems to me that the salient point in Chalmers’s argument (the one
we are about to look at) is about philosophy of language and doesn’t really have much
to do with “mind independent external worlds”.

That is Chalmers is making a general principled claim about the nature of
meaning. So Chalmers is pointing out a kind of confusion around certain kinds of
abstract ideas. At the same time though Chalmers, on the object level appears to be
dealing with claims very much like our own. Chalmers applies a general principle to a
specific kind of case (that we are living in a simulation) and we borrow that principle to
explain why our distinction doesn’t presume the existence of a mind independent
external world.

Solids are made of empty space.
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Chalmers is interested in a hypothetical case where we are in fact living in a
simulation. Were it the case that we are in fact living in a simulation, Chalmers asks,
would it then follow that our universe isn’t “real”?

In such a case there would seemingly be reason to believe that our world is not
real. After all the world simulating our world, that is the world our simulation is
happening inside of, is the real world (or at least one step closer to the real world). What
we naively thought of as chairs and tables would then really be bytes, or magic, or
whatever makes our simulated world exist. Really though the table is simulated; the
table is not real. The table isn’t made from real stuff, the table is made from simulated
stuff, the table is made of bytes. We are simulated and unreal, or at least that’s how it
might seem upon first analysis.

Chalmers though disagrees with such an assessment of this hypothetical
simulated world. According to Chalmers, even in the case that we were living in a
simulation it would not then follow that our world is not real; rather it would follow that
what we really meant when we spoke about realness is different than what we had once
thought.

In other words, when we said “real 1” we really meant “real 2”. This concept of
“by x we really meant y” (where in this case x is our understanding of “real” prior to
knowledge of the simulation and y is our understanding of “real” after knowledge of the
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simulation) is the subject of our interest in Chalmers. Chalmers introduces this principle
though by going back to an historical case.

It was once the case, Chalmers says, that we thought that things like tables and
chairs were totally solid.

If we looked close enough we were able to observe that things like tables and
chairs, solid things, are in fact almost entirely made up of empty space. Yet we still
believe that things like chairs and tables are solid. The discovery that empty space
made up most of tables and chairs did not make tables and chairs any less solid.

We did not decide that chairs were not solid. Instead we continued to believe
that chairs were solid but that our understanding of solid was, at a deeper level, different
than we expected it to be. Whereas we once thought that solid things were things
without any empty space, we later realized that solid things are simply things without
easily visible empty space.

So Chalmers says, the same is true for the computational simulation hypothesis:
"The Computational Hypothesis says that physics as we know it not the fundamental
level of reality. Just as chemical processes underlie biological processes, and
microphysical processes underlie chemical processes, something underlies
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microphysical processes. Underneath the level of quarks and electrons and photons is a
further level: the level of bits." (40).

In other words, in the same way that we say that chairs are still solid (despite the
fact that they are mostly made up of empty space) so too we would say that that which
we take to be real (what we call our “reality”) is still real. In the case of the chair we
realized that what it means to be solid is different than what we thought it meant to be
solid; in the case that we were in a simulated reality we would realize that reality is
different than we thought it was. What it means to be real, at the deeper level, is
different than we expected real to mean.

Does “being in a simulation” even mean anything?

Our interest though isn’t in such a case. Our interest is in the conceptual
mechanism that allowed Chalmers to say “by x we really meant y”. We don’t really care
about the object level case, in fact, I’m not sure it’s even sensical. If we're going to take
Chalmers’s conceptual framework though we should at least be clear about the object
level case that we disagree with. That is we agree with Chalmers on the nature of
meaning but not on the case he applies it to. We totally disagree with Chalmers on the
case of the simulation. As it stands I don’t, to my best understanding at least, think that
this idea of finding out that we are in a simulation is at all sensical. What would that
knowledge of being inside of a simulation look like?
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Confusion about words
Some people say that the question of consciousness is pretty much nonsensical,
that not only do we not know the answer, but we can’t even imagine what an answer
would look like. That is the question of what physical processes give rise to experience
doesn’t make sense in that we don’t even know what a possible answer could look like.

In other words we suppose some entity x exists. We believe that x is the answer
to the question of how physical things give rise to experience. However, there is no x, or
if there is an x we have no idea what it could possibly look like. We don’t know the kind
of thing that it is. We could not invent any x that could in theory explain how physical
things give rise to experience. The idea of being in a simulation is a lot like this x. That
is like x we can seemingly have meaningful conversations about being inside a
simulation, but also like x, when look closely we see that there is no possible answer to
the question “what does it mean to be inside a simulation”.

When speaking about simulations we consider the idea that we are in a
simulation without any obvious problems. That is, we assume that the idea of being in a
simulation means something (in other words we assume that it’s a sensical idea). We
assume that there is a case that we would classify as being in a simulation, but what
would such a case look like? I claim that in the same way that we don’t know the kind
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of answer which would explain the physical-experience problem so to we don’t even
know the kind of criteria which would qualify as “being in a simulation”.

Being in a simulation doesn’t mean anything? It sure meant something in
The Matrix!
What? Of course we know what it’s like to be in a simulation! For example the
matrix, which Chalmers's paper on realness inside of a simulation is about, captures it
perfectly. Neo is born in a simulation and until he meets Morpheus, that simulation is
where he lives. But eventually Neo meets Morpheus, he takes the red pill, goes to the
pay phone and exits the simulation.

This appears pretty sensical and totally counter to my claim that “being in a
simulation is nonsensical”. After all Neo is working in an office, he is in a simulation.
When he takes the red pill and disappears through the phone to Zion he is isn’t in a
simulation, right?

No. Let’s call the supposed “simulated” reality where Neo is a 9-5 office worker
“office world”. We will call the so called “real world”, the one where the robots and Zion
are, “Zion world”. Now let me ask you, what makes you think that Zion world is non
simulated and that office world is simulated? Yes, yes, Morpheus told Neo that office
world was simulated, and that Zion world was not simulated, but we’re doing philosophy
here so we need to do better than that; we can’t take Morpheus’s word for it.
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Which world was simulated?
At first glance we want to point out that Neo began in one simulated universe and
stepped through the payphone into a non-simulated universe, right? OK, so he was in
one world and he stepped into another and so the first world must be a simulation.
Right?

Well, suppose the following counter factual case: suppose that office world was
the non-simulated world and that Zion world was the simulated world. Would the movie
look any different?

I don’t think so. We assume that Neo stepped into the phone booth in simulated
office world and woke up in non-simulated Zion world. However, we have no reason to
suppose that Neo really stepped into the phone booth in non-simulated office world and
stepped out in simulated Zion world. That is, there is nothing to differentiate the
simulation from the non-simulation. Nothing of course except for Morpheus’s word, but
that’s not nearly enough for us.

In other words, everything we saw in the movie was equally compatible with
either world being the simulated world. Because we are not able to distinguish a case
where Zion is simulated and office world is non simulated from a case where the roles
are reversed, we have no reason to believe that one world as opposed to the other is
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simulated. At this point we have only shown that one cannot distinguish the simulated
world from the non-simulated world but we still assume that one of the worlds, even if
we don’t know which one, is simulated, right?

No. There is nothing to distinguish going from a simulated world to a
non-simulated world from the case of going from one world to another world (in the
same universe) via some, I don’t know, let’s say transport beam. Likewise we couldn’t
distinguish moving from simulation to non-simulation from, let’s say, moving from one
universe to another. To the best of my knowledge though I have no idea what could be
thought of as being in a simulation. I don’t know what it would mean to live in a
simulation.

We might want to say that we know that one world is simulated and that the other
world isn’t simulated because the movement of bytes in one world corresponds to every
state and change of state in the other world. . This doesn’t work because there are
many counterexamples which can demonstrate that just because there are bytes
corresponding to everything in a given reality it does not follow that those bytes are
simulating the reality matching those bytes.

First, supposing that it’s possible for some universe to simulate another universe,
then the same should be true of our universe. Our universe should seemingly be able to
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simulate other universes. More specifically our universe should be able to simulate our
own universe itself.

That is suppose that someone announced tomorrow that they are going to create
reality z, a simulated world that looks exactly like our own. In such a case we would all
agree that we exist outside of that specific reality z. That is, there are bytes
corresponding to everything in our universe and yet we know that that specific reality z
isn’t simulating our own reality. So we see that just because bytes correspond to things
in one reality it doesn’t follow that that specific reality is itself a simulation.

Now I know that some people will claim that while such a case wouldn’t
demonstrate that we are inside of that specific reality z that we are still very likely, inside
of another reality z one level higher up. This is not however a problem, because we
have still not explained what it means to be inside of a simulated reality. We know that
the mere correspondence of bytes doesn’t mean that one reality is simulated but
perhaps there are other conditions?

We could go on a lot more with this; although this line of reasoning explains our
disagreement with Chalmers it isn’t complete. However, we have provided the basic
outline of our disagreement with Chalmers although we didn’t consider every possible
counter example. The point is that we disagree with Chalmers's object level case and
question whether “being inside of a simulation” is even a meaningful term.
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Back to the structure of Chalmers's argument

Forgetting about what “being in a simulation” even means, our interest is in
Chalmers’ more general principle. Chalmers said that when we discovered that solids
were made up of empty space our understanding of what it really meant to be solid
changed. I propose that Chalmers's argument can be used to resolve our apparent
claim on the existence of an external world: Chalmers's argument explains why our
distinction doesn’t actually commit us to the existence of the external world.

Let’s look back at the basic structure of Chalmers’s argument. Once we have the
structure of his argument we can apply it to our case. As it stands now our distinction
seems to imply the existence of a mind independent external world. We will use
Chalmers's argument to explain why that is not the case, why our distinction is neutral
on the existence of mind independent external worlds and why our distinction is totally
compatible with the possibility that there is no mind independent external world. Let’s
take a look at the basic structure of Chalmers’s case.

First Chalmers introduces a term which names both a set of things, and which
also corresponds to a specific definition. In one of Chalmers's examples the term was
“real”. The term named things like ourselves as well as things like the universe we live
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in. In Chalmers example the term also had a definition which excluded things simulated
in bytes. The set of things we apply the term to have the features of that term’s
definition: namely our universe was real in that it wasn’t simulated because we assumed
that our universe wasn’t simulated.

But then, in Chalmers example we found out that the set of things named by the
term don’t have the properties which the term was supposed to define: we found out
that the things included in “real” (our universe) are in fact simulated. All of the things we
called “real” didn’t fit into our definition of real.

Nevertheless we realized that the term does in fact name all the things we
thought it named, but that it’s definition was at a deeper level different than we thought it
was. Our universe was still real. All that changed was our definition of “real”: “real” we
discovered included simulated universes.

In both Chalmers’s example of realness as well as his example of solidity, the
term has both a naming function and a definition. The naming function serves to
distinguish one kind of thing from the other. For example “solid” serves to distinguish
things like chairs from things like water. The definition serves to explain why things fall
under the term, like how the definition of solid can be used to determine that a chair is
solid but that fumes are not solid.
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When we found out that the things which fall under the naming function don’t at a
deeper lever fall under the definition, we changed the definition to better fit the things it
named. I propose that we can do the same thing to our distinction if in fact there is no
mind independent external world. More specifically I propose that the purpose of
our distinction is to distinguish claims like those about chairs from claims like
those like about evil; the purpose of our distinction is not to make claims about
the essential nature of physical things.

In the example of “real” the term had a function and a definition. Later we
realized that the definition didn’t match the function so we changed the definition. In our
case though we have a function and a definition which matches that function; however
the definition is only meant to fulfill its function and it does so without making claims
about mind independent external worlds. In the case that there is no mind independent
external worlds, however, our definition can be changed to include mind independent
external worlds.

We first introduced our distinction to perform a certain function. There are two
kinds of things that we want to separate from each other. We want to separate claims
which we think of as corresponding to things in the world from claims which don’t
correspond to things in the world.
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In other words we want to separate claims about “evil” and perhaps certain kinds
of aesthetic claims, as well as certain kinds of formal claims, from claims that we can
simply look at the world to determine their true value. The purpose of our distinction is
merely to serve that function: to separate these two kinds of claims from one another.

With that in mind let’s explain why our distinction doesn’t assume the existence
of a mind independent external world. Let’s suppose then that there is no mind
independent external world. Would it then follow that the things we call “physical things”
are in fact no different than the things we call “non-physical things”?

I don’t think so.

You see, even if there in fact is no mind independent external world, our
distinction would still serve its function. It’s function is to distinguish claims about things
like chairs from claims about things like evil. We say that physical claims are about
things that exist in the world itself and that non-physical things exist only as mental
categories because that’s a useful way to distinguish claims about things like chairs
from claims about things like evil. The definition doesn’t say anything about mind
independent external worlds at all; it simply performs its function of distinguishing these
two kinds of claims. Were it the case that there were no mind independent external
world we would still define physical claims and non-physical claims the same way
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because they would still serve the important function of distinguishing two kinds of
claims from one another.

In the case that there was no mind independent physical world there would still
be things which are physical and things which are nonphysical: there would still be
things that exist in the world itself and things which exist only as mental categories. The
function of those terms would not change. They would still differentiate two kinds of
things and two kinds of claims from one another. All that would change is that, at a
deeper level, what we think of as being physical and existing in the world would, in a
small way, be different than we might have expected.

Whereas we might have at first thought that physical things were things that
existed in the world and not in our thoughts, we would, given no mind independent
external world, simply change our deeper definition is a very small way. We would
simply say that “physical world” is the physical part of the mental world. That is, given
the existence of a mind dependent external world we would simply explain the
distinction between physical claims and nonphysical claims as follows.

Both physical things and non-physical things, everything, would exist only in the
mind. What we call physical and non-physical would both just be subsets of things
which are really mental. We would then divide up the world which exists, again, only in
the mind, into the subset of that mental world which is physical and into the subset of
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that mental world which is non-physical. Just because there is no physical world doesn’t
mean that evil and chairs are both thoughts in the exact same way. At the very least we
can admit that you can cut a chair in half with a saw but that you can’t cut evil in half
with a saw. Physical things would be different than mental things in the same way that
they always were.

In other words, even if we assume that there is no mind independent external
world, there would still be claims about chair,s and about evil, and only one of those two
types of claims could still be evaluated by looking at the world. All that has changed now
is that when we say ‘physical world’ we now mean the part of the mental world that has
the properties related to physical things. Likewise when we say “non-physical things”, or
mental things, we mean the area of the mind dependent world which can’t be evaluated
by looking at the world. When we would speak about physical things we would simply
mean the kind of claims that we could look at the (essentially mental) physical world to
resolve.

So then, we make no commitments to the existence of a mind independent
physical world. That we distinguish between physical things and mental things is merely
a functional definition; there is an important difference between those two kinds of
things. The important difference between those two kinds of things, these two kinds of
claims, is that we can determine their truth values in different ways. That we determine
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their truth values differently holds the same even in the case that there is no mind
independent external world.

When we distinguish physical things from mental things we are not implying that
physical things are not at a deeper level mental. We are merely saying that there is a
difference between physical things and mental things, and that the difference would
remain even in the case that there was no mind independent external world. Indeed all
that would change in such a case is that physical would mean the part of the mental
world that is physical, while non-physical would mean the part of the mental world that
only has to do with things like mental categorization. So then our distinction in totally
neutral on the existence of mind independent external world.

There is no problem of assuming the existence a mind independent external
world. Our distinction doesn’t assume the existence of a mind independent external
world. Our distinction is totally compatible with the existence of the mind independent
external world. This resolves our discussion of the mind independent external world.
Now we move onto our comparison with Ayer.
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Chapter 3: Ayer
Outline of this section
In his explanation of logical positivism, Ayer introduces a criterion to determine
the meaningfulness of a claim. The criterion is Ayer’s loose verificationist principle which
he uses to distinguish meaningful claims from nonmeaningful claim. In this section we
will compare our distinction to Ayer’s loose verificationist principle. We will first consider
similarities, then differences, finally we will consider some points brought up by Ayer
which might present problems for our distinction. First though an outline of the three
parts of this chapter.

Outline of similarities with Ayer
We introduce Ayer’s verification principle, which, like our distinction, can divide
up the set of all possible claims into two groups. I will argue that the membership of
those two groups is, with the exception of tautological claims, mostly identical to the two
4

groups produced by our distinction .

That is in other words that, for a given set of non-tautological claims, our distinction
and Ayer’s verification principle will divide up the set of possible claims into two identical
groups.
4
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Differences with Ayer
After we have reviewed the similarities between our distinction and Ayer’s
verification principle we will proceed to the differences. An important difference I will
argue is in the attribution of meaning and meaninglessness. That is, while our distinction
makes no commitments on the meaningfulness of nonphysical claims, Ayer holds that
all non-tautological but non-physical claims, are meaningless.

One other major difference rests in Ayer’s understanding of rationality and the
function of factual claims which Ayer uses to redefine probability. It will follow from those
three things that Ayer might allow claims to be grouped differently depending on what
method of forming beliefs one considers reliable. In this case it can in theory follow that
Ayer’s test will group claims very differently than we would group them. It might follow
that our distinction only groups claims similarly to Ayer’s when one, like Ayer, considers
science a reliable method for assessing beliefs.

A more trivial difference will be come from the way Ayer categorizes tautologies.
However, that isn’t of much interest to us.

Problems Ayer introduces
Once we have finished our comparison with Ayer we will consider some
problems for our distinction brought up indirectly by Ayer.
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One problem for example will come from Ayer’s dismissal of the strict
verificationist principle. Ayer points out that no empirical claims can even in theory be
completely falsified/verified. Ayer’s criticism of the strict verification principle would
prima facie be applicable to our distinction. Our distinction will have to answer to that
criticism. We will need to consider our argument that claims about physical things can
have their truth value determined simply by comparing them to the actual world. It would
seem, correctly, that given Ayer’s argument, comparison between claim and world isn’t
sufficient to settle a claim’s truth value.

Intro to Ayer
Before we begin our comparison with Ayer we need to introduce his criterion.

Ayer’s introduces a kind of test meant to be applied to a claim: “We need only
formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a sentence expresses a
genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that the sentences under
consideration fail to satisfy it.”(35). That is on the basis of Ayer’s test we are able to
determine if a given claim about a matter of fact is or is not meaningful. I should quickly
note, I mean that all non-tautological claims are either meaningless or are matters of
fact. So then, put another way, we can simply apply the test to a given claim and
determine if the claim is in fact meaningful. Let’s take a look at the actual test.
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5

Ayer broadly introduces his test: “We say that a sentence is factually significant
to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it
purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under
certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being
false.”(35) . What Ayer means is that a given claim is meaningful only when a future
sensory experience can in theory confirm or disconfirm the belief. Put another way, a
claim is only meaningful if it is less consistent with some potential future experiences
than it is with others. A meaningful claim should, is short, put some kind of a constraint
on expected future experiences such that it is compatible with some sensory
experiences but not with others.

However, “If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character
that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption
whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is
concerned, it is. if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition.” (35). In other words, if a
given claim is consistent with every possible future sensory experience then the claim is
meaningless. Let’s take a step back.

5

I say that ,“Ayer broadly introduces his test”, because Ayer adds more and more nuance to the test as
he goes on and because what we are now presenting is an unnuanced introduction to Ayer’s test. There
is a lot of nuance for example in how Ayer defines “verify”. Likewise we couldn’t fully understand what
Ayer means by “observations would lead him” unless we know about Ayer’s unusual usage of “probability”
which in turn comes from his definition of rationality, which in turn...you get what I’m doing.
The point I’m trying to make in this footnote is that we won’t even attempt to provide a fully nuanced view
of Ayer’s test, although we will eventually provide an understanding of Ayer that is nuanced in areas
related to our distinction . Afterall, the entire “language truth and logic” is an explanation of the nuanced
version of Ayer’s test and the test’s application and would be way too much to include: “the adoption of
this procedure is an essential factor in the argument of this book, it needs to be examined in detail” (36).
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To this point we have only given a general overview of Ayer’s test, or criterion.
While there are some important nuances that we will add as we go on, for the time
being let’s try to get a good understanding the current unnuanced version of the test.
Let’s consider two example cases, and illustrate how Ayer’s test is applied to the
exemplar case. Here I will use the same two exemplar claims that were previously used
to demonstrate the application of our own criterion.

(1): “There is a chair over there”.

To apply Ayer’s test we need to ask ourselves, are there any future observations
that would make us more or less likely to believe (1)? In this case there are some such
obvious potential observations. For example, if I observe that there is no chair at the
specified location I will be much less confident that (1) is true. Conversely if I look at the
specified location and see a chair I will be more confident that (1) is true. (1) is thus
meaningful because it is consistent with some observations but is not consistent with
other observations.

Put another way, there are predictions following from (1), namely the prediction
amounting to the sensory experience of seeing a chair; these predictions can be tested
by observing the specified location of the chair.
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I should just point out so that there is no confusion that according to Ayer,
sensory experience can never conclusively verify/falsify any claim. When we say that a
certain sensory experience isn’t consistent with a certain claim we simply mean that it
increases the probability that the claim is false; it doesn’t mean that we have
conclusively demonstrated that the claim is false. Likewise, there is never any case
where we can settle a claim as conclusively verified. The exception to these rules are
6

tautologies which are, according to Ayer, true or false with complete certainty .

Let’s look at our second exemplar claim.

(2): “killing puppies is evil”

6

Ayer says that tautologies have definitive truth values. I’m not sure if I agree with Ayer on this point. The
disagreement stems from the following hypothetical counter example, although there are many other
similar counterexamples.
We use the term “working memory” to broadly describe the amount of variables a person is able to
manipulate at a given time. That definition isn’t perfect but it’s more than close enough. Now considering
a tautology like “all unmarried men are bachelors” requires us to manipulate a couple of variables. We
have to take ‘bachelor’ and ask ourselves, what is that terms definition. We then remember that bachelor
is defined as unmarried man.
The problem is that the previous operations require us to competently manipulate two variables;
something which is broadly speaking measurable. So then, it follows that our ability to assess tautologies
is contingent on a matter of fact. Our ability to assess tautologies is contingent on our working memory.
However, that our working memory can correctly manipulate two variables can never be conclusively
verified. It is afterall an empirical claim. So then our ability to assess tautologies is contingent on
something which can never be conclusively verified. It would then seem to follow that tautologies cannot
be conclusively verified. However then, since tautologies are not themselves empirically falsifiable, though
contingent on empirically falsifiable claims, it will then follow that tautologies are not merely trivally
meaningful claims, but that tautologies are meaningless in the same way that, according to Ayer, ethical
claims are meaningless.
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Some quick notes about (2). We say “killing puppies is evil” where “evil” is only a
value judgment, but not a predictive tool such as it might be in the case that a violent
mob is killing “evil” people, or to use a more realistic example in that case that “evil”
people receive social sanction. In other words, in (2) we talking about the attribution of a
moral value.

Again, to apply Ayer’s test we need to ask ourselves, are there any future
observations that would make us more or less likely to believe (2)? More appropriately
are there any predictions made by (2) such that their apparent success/failure will alter
the probability of (2) being true? Prima facie there are no such predictions. I can think of
no observation that claims about evil would preclude. (2) is thus is consistent with all
experiences, so then we say that (2) is meaningless.

This concludes our overview of Ayer’s criterion. We will now compare Ayer’s
criterion to our own and in doing so I will argue that Ayer’s criterion is similar to our
own.

Comparison with Ayer

In our thesis we proposed that that all claims can be divided into two sets. They
are the set of claims about physical things, and the set of claims about non-physical
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things. We proposed a test to determine which of the two types a given claim is. Our
test for a claim’s type was simply to ask of any given belief, “will there be some
difference in the world itself corresponding to the truth value of the claim”. If there is a
difference in the world itself corresponding to the truth value of the claim, we said that
the claim is a claim about physical things, that it is a physical claim. However, if there is
no difference in the world corresponding to the truth value of the claim, we said that the
claim is about non-physical things, that the claim is a non-physical claim. And so for any
set of claims we can use this test to divide up the claims into these two sets. Ayer
divides up the set of potential claims in a similar way.

Like us, Ayer introduced two types of claims along with a test to divide potential
claims: ”We need only formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a
sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact, and then point out that
the sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it”(35). Ayer, like us, can divide up a set
of claims into two sets: the set of meaningful claims, and into the set of meaningless
claims.

7

I propose for the time being , that, with the exception of tautological claims, the
8

membership of Ayer’s two sets will be identical to the membership of our own two sets .

7

We will see that this might not be the case. If we use Ayer’s version of rationality to define “probability” it
might follow that the similarity between our two sets and Ayer’s two sets will be totally contingent.
Contingent that is on what a given person considers to be reliable methods of producing predictions.
8

That is in other words, that for a given set of claims both Ayer’s criterion and our own criterion will divide
up that set of potential claims into two sets, and that for the membership of each one of those two sets, its
membership will be identical to the membership of one of Ayer’s two sets.
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That this is true seemingly follows from each of our criterion. Ayer’s criterion for
the meaningfulness of a claim, put one way, is that there be some possible sense
experience that is inconsistent with the given claim: “ ‘Would any observations be
relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood?’. And it is only if a negative
answer is given to this second question [the second question being the question in the
previous sentence] that we conclude that the statement under consideration is
nonsensical”(38) That is in other words that for a given claim, there should be some
sense experience it is consistent with and other sense experience that it is not
consistent with. In other words that our sense experience of the world should be
different based on the truth value of the claim.

That criterion for the meaningfulness of a claim is, you might notice, very similar
to our criterion for physical claim: a claim is a physical claim if some area of the world
will be different corresponding to the truth value of that claim. This isn’t exactly like
Ayer’s criterion but it’s close. While our criterion holds that a claim is physical if
something in the world changes based on that claim’s truth value, Ayer’s criterion holds
that a claim is meaningful if some potential sense experience is inconsistent with the
claim.

More specifically, the membership of our set of claims about physical things will be
identical to the membership of Ayer’s set of meaningful claims; likewise the membership
of our set of claims about non-physical things will be identical to the membership of
Ayer’s set of non-meaningful claims.
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So then our criteria for physical claims hinges upon the relation between a
claim’s truth value and the possible worlds corresponding to it. Ayer’s criteria hinges
upon the relation between a claim’s truth value and future sensory experience. So then
our individual criterions might appear to be different, after all a sensory experience is a
different thing than the actual state of the world, right? Maybe. That will depend on our
answer to the question, are there any parts of the physical world that can be different
corresponding to different truth values but which nevertheless produce no differing
potential sensory experience?

That last paragraph was a mouthful, we will need to break it down into a simpler
form. Suppose the set of all possible physical claims. It will be true that every member
of that set, every physical claim, will have some difference in the world corresponding to
each of its truth values. What we want to know then is, for all of those potential
differences in the world corresponding to each truth value, is there any pair of such
corresponding worlds which cannot, even in theory, be distinguished with a sensory
experience? This is what we mean when we ask, will every difference in the world
correspond to only some potential sensory experience but not to other potential sensory
experiences? Put more simply, can every difference in the world potentially be
distinguished by sense experience?
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Looking for claims that will help us answer this question, one claim comes to
mind.

The claim I’m thinking of is the question, “a tree falls in the forest and no one is
9

around to hear it, does it make a sound” ? We can alter that question a bit so that it’s
making a claim: “when a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, the tree
makes a sound”. Also let’s assume that by sound we don’t mean the experience of
sound, but the vibrations. Let’s see if Ayer will handle this claim the same way we will
handle it

According to Ayer the claim will be meaningful only if there are some potential
sensory experiences which are inconsistent with the claim. There is, however, no
obvious sense experiences which is inconsistent with the claim. After all, the claim is
specifically about a case where there is no one around to have immediate sensory
experiences of the falling tree. According to Ayer then the claim will prima facie be
10

meaningless . Remember, if our criterion classifies this claim as a physical claim, we
9

The idea to use this example to illustrate empiricism/positivism wasn’t my idea. I saw it in a blog post
“Making Beliefs Pay Rent (in Anticipated Experiences)” by Eliezer Yudkowsky. There he uses the
example to argue that we should reduce beliefs to what they can predict and that we should make beliefs
“pay rent” by making accurate predictions. The point is that I got the idea to use this example from
Yudkowsky even though he uses it to make another empiricist claim.
10

We said that, according to Ayer, the claim,“when a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear
it, the tree makes a sound”, would be meaningless. We said that the claim would be meaningless
because there is no sense experience that can be inconsistent with that claim given that the claim
precludes any sense experience. After all the claim is about a sound which no one is around to hear. So
then it seems like, according to Ayer, this claim would be meaningless.
However one might object that in theory there might still be sense experiences that are inconsistent with
this claim. For example, one might imagine that there might have been a recorder at the scene of the
falling tree. We only said that no one was around to hear the tree fall, but there might still have a been an
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will have demonstrated that our criterion is different than Ayer’s criterion. How then
would we apply our criterion to this claim?

To apply our criterion to this case we need to ask ourselves, will a world where
this claim is true itself be different from a world where this claim is false? More
specifically though we said that the world where the claim is true will only be different
than the world where the claim is false if we are able to look at the world and determine
which of the two possible worlds we are in. However, we could only distinguish which of
the two worlds we live in on the basis of sensory experience. In other words, our
criterion, like Ayer’s criterion, really distinguishes between claims which are consistent
with all sensory experience from claims which are inconsistent with some sensory
experience.

audio recorder recording the sound of the falling tree. Given then that possibility, there is at least in theory
some future sense experience that is inconsistent with the claim. That is the sense experience of listening
to a potential audio recording of the fallen tree might be inconsistent with the claim, for example in the
case that a recording of the fallen tree has no falling tree noises. So it would seem that our exemplar
claim is in fact potentially inconsistent with some sense experience. It should then follow that the claim
about the falling tree is meaningful according to Ayer.
To this can simply respond by amending our claim. The purpose of the exemplar case was to provide a
possible physical claim that is meaningless. That is to say that we want to provide a claim that might be
about the world itself but is definitely not inconsistent with any sense experience. That’s not to say that
the claim is a physical claim, but simply that the claim might be a physical claim but will require further
analysis.
So then, if one is going to claim that our exemplar claim is still in theory inconsistent with some sense
experiences was can amend the claim so as to be consistent with any sense experience. For example we
might say ,“when a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, neither person nor recorder, the
tree makes a sound”. Better yet we might say that ,“when a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to
hear it, nor are there any potential sensory experiences that connected to the sound of the falling tree, the
tree makes a sound”. In doing so we would preserve the purpose of our example. The claim still might be
a physical claim but is at the same time clearly not inconsistent with any sensory experience. The claim is
still meaningless. We can thus modify our exemplar claim in the case that one argues that the claim is
inconsistent with some sensory experiences.
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Let’s review then where this leaves us. We wanted to know if our distinction was
unlike Ayer’s. Specifically we wanted to know if there are any claims about the world
itself which are nevertheless consistent with all sensory experience. Such a case would
have demonstrated that our criterion was in certain cases different than Ayer’s criterion.
However we remembered that we define a difference in the world itself as a difference
such that we are able to determine which of the two worlds we are living in by observing
the world. In other words, our criterion, like Ayer’s, really distinguishes claims on the
basis of sensory experience. Our distinction is then to this point, though worded
differently, still similar to Ayer’s criterion, that is it is similar in the sense that both
criterions divide up potential claims into matching groups.

In short then it does indeed seem to follow that for every difference in the world
corresponding to a claim’s truth value there must also be a sensory experience. In short
then, all meaningful claims would appear to also be claims about physical things.

Before we really get into the major substantive differences between our criterion
and Ayer’s criterion there is one more comparison we need to make. We need to
consider Ayer’s “loose verificationist principle”. But first, let’s recall one unresolved
problem from the first chapter. The problems brought up by our previously unresolved
problem will lead into our discussion of Ayer’s “loose verificationist principle”. That is in
other words we will review an previously unresolved problem before introducing Ayer’s
“loose verificationist principle”; the principle will then help us resolve our problem.
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You might remember from our introduction that we decided to hold off on the
discussion of two kinds of physical claims until later in the paper. We called these
claims “(3)” and “(4)". Claim (3) included all claims about universal laws such as claims
about gravity. Claim (4) included claims about non universal laws which are still mostly
true, like claims that mammals are extremely sensitive to aversive stimulus that are
related to food; what’s salient about claims like (4) is that they are mostly true but
certainly incorrect at times.

There was however a challenge to applying our criterion to these two cases. The
problem was that it was difficult to imagine how exactly a world where claims like (3)
and (4) are true will be different than a world where claims like (3) and (4) are false.

Sure in cases like (1), the case of the chair, it’s seemingly easy to distinguish a
world where (1) is true from a world where (1) is false. But in the case of both (3) and
(4) it’s a bit more difficult to imagine how exactly a world where the claim is false will
look different than a world where the claim is true.

Let’s review why it is difficult to distinguish a world where claims like (3), or (4)
are true from a world where claims like (3), or (4) are false. We begin with (3).
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Claims like (3): claims about universal laws such as claims asserting
the existence of gravity

Consider claims like claim (3). That is claims about universal laws, such as for
11

example, claims asserting the existence of gravity. Remember, we said that claims like
(3) are claims about physical things. However, to meet our standard for “claims about
physical things” there must be some difference in the world corresponding to the truth
value of the claim. That is, for (3) to be a claim about a physical thing it must be the
case that we can determine the truth value of the claim by looking at the world. Yet, in
the case of claims like claims about gravity, it’s hard to pinpoint how exactly a world
where the claim is true will be different than a world where the claim is false. Let’s apply
our criterion to (3.1) and see what problems come up.

(3.1) “gravity exists”, also assume that “gravity” represents a specific predictive
formula that is meant to make accurate predictions for a certain set of cases.

First we can ask ourselves, what will a world where (3.1) is false look like? We
might then say that in a world where (3.1) is false, that objects will move in such a way
that we cannot use relations of mass to predict their motion. Sure, there are less
extreme cases where we might say that (3.1) is false, however, we can all agree that in

11

We use ‘existence’ but ‘existence’ might be a bit too strong of a word. I want to make clear I’m not
claiming that gravity is a thing that exists in the same way that say a chair might exist. When I see that
gravity exists I simply mean something like “this gravity abstraction is an accurate predictive tool”.
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the previous case (3.1) is clearly false. In such a world we can clearly say that there is
no universal law of gravity.

Then we ask ourselves, what will a world where (3.1) is true look like? To this we
can say, that in the case that some formula for gravity can predict all movement based
on relations of mass, that (3.1) is clearly true. That is, all predictions based on gravity
will be correct without any need for auxiliary hypothesis.

So then we might claim, (3.1) is clearly a physical claim. After all there is a big
difference between these two worlds. And so we might think that claims like (3.1) can be
simply settled; such claims are claims about physical things because we can distinguish
the truth value of the claim by looking at the world.

However, we notice that this (3.1) is different than (1), the claim of the chair.

‘ (1) “there is a chair over there” ‘

In that case we said that if the claim was true, the chair would be in the specified
location. If the claim was false there would be no chair in the specified location. So then
we can seemingly always look at the world to determine the claim’s truth value. In the
case of the chair we were seemingly a
 lways able to distinguish the world where (1) was

50

true from the world where (1) was false. In the case of (1) we took it for granted that we
could distinguish a world where (1) was true from a world where (1) was false.

However, in the case of claims like (3.1) it’s much harder to distinguish the truth
value of the claim by looking at the world. Save for extreme cases such as a possible
world where some formula for gravity always makes perfect predictions without any
auxiliary hypothesis, it’s unclear how we can look at the world to determine the truth
value of claims asserting gravity. In cases like (3.1) it’s unclear if we can look at the
world to determine the truth value of the claim.

In summary the problem of cases like (3.1), claims about universal laws, is that
it’s unclear whether one can distinguish the truth value of the claim by looking at the
world. Whereas in our simplified case (1) it seems to be that case that we can always
simply look at the world to determine the truth value of the claim, it’s unclear whether
looking at the world can always resolve claims like (3.1). I for one couldn’t provide the
exact conditions under which (3.1) has a specific truth value.

Claims like (4): claims about loose laws such as general rules
governing how mammals learn

Let’s move onto our consideration of cases which propose general rules which
allow for some exceptions.
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(4) “mammals are particularly sensitive to aversive stimuli related to things that
they eat”

The problem with claims like (4), that is loose rules, is that it’s unclear how
exactly a world where the claim is true will be different from a world where the claim is
false. For example (4) would be true even if it didn’t hold for a single person; it would
even be true in the case that it didn’t hold for a single species. How then, given that we
acknowledge possible small exceptions to the rules, can one distinguish a world where
(4) is true from a world where (4) is false? How can we say that claims like (4) are
physical claims, when we are unsure how to distinguish a world where (4) is true from a
world where (4) is false? For claims like (4) to be claims about physical. things we must
be able to determine the truth value of the claim by looking at the world, however, it’s
uncertain which observations would be sufficient to determine its truth value.

Using Ayer’s loose verificationist principle to solve for (3) and
(4)
In the previous sections we discussed a problem with assigning the status of
“physical claim” to claims like (3), and (4). The problem was that for a claim to be a
“physical claim” we must be able to distinguish a world where the claim is true from a
world where the claim is false. For claims like (3), and (4), however, we are unsure how
to go about distinguishing worlds where they are true from worlds where they are false.
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Up until this point we have taken for granted that this problem facing (3), and (4),
isn’t applicable to (1). That is, in the case of (1) we are always able to distinguish a
world where (1) is true from a world where (1) is false. To do that we need only observe
the placement of the chair; that information alone is enough to determine the truth value
of (1). So then (1), unlike (3) and (4), meets the criterion for being a physical claim.

In what follows we will review Ayer’s loose verificationist principle. Ayer’s loose
verificationist principle will force us to answer some questions we have to this point left
unanswered. As we will see our criterion, like Ayer’s, requires something like his loose
verificationist principle. Once we have clarified the kind of verificationist principle we will
use we will see that the questions facing (3) and (4) are also applicable to (1). Then with
some clarification we will settle the question facing (1), (3), and (4).

The verificationist principle

According to Ayer a claim can only be meaningful if there are potential sensory
experiences which are inconsistent with the claim. The “loose verificationist principle”
we’re about to look at describes what it means for a sensory experience to be
inconsistent with a claim.
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Ayer’s introduces his criterion, “he knows what observations would lead him,
under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being
false”(35): under certain conditions, certain sensory experiences will mean that the
claim is false, while other sensory experiences will mean that the claim is true. Claims
which meet this criterion will be meaningful while claims which fail to meet this criterion
will be meaningless. And yet some questions remain. What does Ayer mean when he
speaks about accepting or rejecting a claim?

Ayer says first that for a claim to be meaningful there must be potential sensory
experiences which can verify the claim and make us “accept the proposition as being
true". Does Ayer then mean to say that for a claim to be meaningful there must be
potential sensory experiences which conclusively determine that the claim is true?

Likewise Ayer says that for a claim to be meaningful there must be potential
sensory experiences which can falsify the claim and make us “reject it as being false”.
Does Ayer then mean to say that for a claim to be meaningful there must be potential
sensory experiences which conclusively determine that the claim is false?

The answer to both of the previous questions is a resounding no. According to
Ayer a claim can neither be conclusively verified nor conclusively falsified. The kind of
verification Ayer is talking isn’t verification the strong sense of the term: “A proposition is
said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if. and only if, its truth could be
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conclusively established in experience”(37). Rather, Ayer means a weaker standard of
verification:“ ‘it is verifiable, in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it
probable’ ” (37). In short Ayer holds that a claim is meaningful not only in the case that it
can be conclusively verified and conclusively falsified by potential sensory experience.
Instead Ayer holds that a claim is meaningful if some potential sensory experiences
render the claim more probable while other potential sensory experiences render the
claim less probable.

More relevant though to our concerns though is why Ayer thinks a strict
verificationist principle can’t be the criterion for meaningfulness. The reason for that is
simple. According to Ayer, no non-tautological claim can ever have its truth value
conclusively determined by sensory experience: “the principle that a sentence can be
factually significant only if it expresses what is conclusively verifiable is self-stultifying as
a criterion of significance. For it leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to make a
significant statement of fact at all.” (38) .

That is to say that no claim will ever meet the criterion of the strict verificationist
principle. The strongest reason that no claim can ever meet the strict verificationist
principle is because any sensory experiences which are inconsistent with a claim will
“presuppose the existence of certain conditions”(38). Allow me to give an example of
what I mean by that.

55

Suppose that some predictive formula for gravity predicts that such and such
object will be in such and such place at a given time. Furthermore, suppose that the
object isn’t in that place at the specified time. At face value we would say that our
formula was falsified. But we can’t say that with certainty. The object we were predicting
might have been an optical illusion. There might have been a massive invisible object
pulling our object in way that is totally consistent with gravity. Our depth perception
might be off. Our understanding of time might be off. So on and so forth. The point is
that for any one of these possible cases our formula would not have been predicted. A
similar line of reasoning can be applied to verification.

I think Ayer’s point is correct. We can never conclusively determine the truth
value of the claim, and that means trouble for our criterion.

We said that the criterion for a physical claim is that one can distinguish a world
where the claim is true from a world where the claim is false. However, given that we
are in agreement with Ayer, we can no longer distinguish a world where a claim is true
from a world where that claim is false. After all, if we cannot conclusively determine the
truth value of the claim then we also cannot perfectly distinguish a world where a claim
is true from a world where a claim is false.

This would hold true, for cases like (3) and (4), where we have already
determined that we can’t perfectly distinguish worlds where they are true from worlds

56

where they are false. This would also hold true for cases like our super simple
introductory claim, (1). For one thing you can’t perfectly determine if the chair is in the
specified location; I mean, what happens if you move the chair over 10 atoms, 100
atoms, 101 atoms. It’s not clear when the chair would be at the specified location and
when it wouldn’t be at that location. It’s not clear which exact atoms constitute the chair:
there are some number of atoms such that their removal would stop the chair from
being the chair, what that exact number is though, I sure don’t know. So on and so forth.
Even the case of the claim about a chair isn’t as black and white as we’ve been
assuming.

Where does that leave us? Well we’ve determined that we agree with Ayer. Strict
verification is impossible, we must adopt some form of loose verification. In our terms,
for a claim to be physical we need not be able to conclusively determine the truth value
of the claim by looking at the world. In what way then must we be able to determine the
truth value of physical claims by looking at the world, given that by “able to distinguish
between possible world” we really mean something along the lines “able to distinguish
between possible worlds in a way which may or may not be correct”? Given that we are
not using a strong verificationist criterion, what does it even mean to distinguish a world
where a claim is true from a world where a claim is false?

What we mean by “for a claim to be a physical claim we must be able to
distinguish a world where the claim is true from a world where the claim is false” is

57

broadly, that some possible worlds must be consistent with the claim while some
possible worlds must be inconsistent with the claim. Note, that by “consistent”, and
“inconsistent” we don’t mean with finality; that is we don’t mean that for a claim to be a
physical claim that there must be both a possible world that is conclusively inconsistent
with the claim and where the claim must be false with finality, as well as some possible
world that is conclusively consistent with the claim and where the claim must true with
finality. Rather, we mean that there must be a possible world where the claim is
inconsistent in the sense that the claim is improbable as well as a possible world that is
consistent with the claim, that is to say a possible world where the claim is more
probable.

Put as simply as possible using everyday language, for a claim to be a physical
claim there must be some possible state of the world which would increase the
likelihood that the claim is true as well as some possible state of affairs which would
increase the likelihood that the claim is false. When we say that for a claim to be a
physical claim we must be able to distinguish a world where the claim is true from a
world where the claim is false, we mean that we must be able to distinguish a world
where the claim is likely to be true from a world where the claim is likely to be false.
This requires further discussion on what we mean by probability but that will come later.

Let’s recap where this leaves us. Initially we had a problem with cases like (3)
and (4). In the cases of (3) and (4) we weren’t sure how exactly to distinguish a world
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where the claim is true from a world where the claim is false. Given however, that (3)
and (4) were both claims about physical things, and given that for a claim to be a
physical claim we must be able to distinguish a world where the claim is true from a
world where the claim is false, the status of (3) and (4) as physical claims was in
question. We noted that in the case of (1), however, we could seemingly always
distinguish a world where (1) was true from a world where (1) is false.

Then we looked at Ayer who claimed that we can never conclusively determine
the truth value of claims about matter of fact. We generally agreed with his point: in the
case of claims about physical things we can never conclusively determine the truth
value of the claim. So then, when we spoke about distinguishing a world where a claim
is true from a world where a claim is false in the case of physical claims we didn’t mean
that we must be able to do so with finality. We merely meant that we must be able to
distinguish a world where the claim is likely to be true from a world where the claim is
likely to be false.

Now that leaves us to return to the cases of (1), (3) and (4). Contrary to our
assumptions, in the case of (1) we cannot conclusively determine the truth value of the
claim by looking at the world. As we said the chair might be an optical illusion, the exact
criterion of “chairness” is unknown, so on and so forth; the point that we can never
12

conclusively determine the truth value of any physical claim , including (1). So then, in

12

Which is not to say that we can conclusively determine the truth value of non-physical claims, but that is
a separate discussion.
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the case of (1), just as in the case of (3) and (4) we cannot conclusively determine the
truth value: we cannot conclusively distinguish a world where (1) is true from a world
where (1) is false.

That we cannot conclusively distinguish a world where claim is true from a world
where a claim is false though doesn’t mean that there are no physical claims. We need
not be able to determine the truth value of physical claims with finality. When we speak
about distinguishing a world where a claim is true from a world where a claim is false we
mean distinguishing a world where the claim is likely to be true from a world where a
claim is likely to be false: by “distinguish between possible worlds” we don’t mean that
one must be able to do so with perfect precision.

Now that’s all well and good but the question remains how is our claim different
than Ayer’s claim, at least for non tautological claims?

To this point we have determined that, with the exception of tautological claims,
we will group the set of possible claims the same way that Ayer would group those
claims; sure we might put different names on our two subsets of claims but their
membership will be identical.

Now, there would be nothing wrong if it were the case that we agreed with Ayer.
However, that is not the case at all. To this point we have been steelmanning the view
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that our distinction is similar to that of Ayer. As we shall soon see, in this next chapter,
our claim is pretty different than that of Ayer in some pretty major ways .
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Chapter 4: A closer look at our comparison with
Ayer.
A summary of how our claim currently compares to Ayer’s claim.
To this point we have attempted to focus on the similarities between our
distinction and between Ayer’s distinction. If I had to summarize the major similarities
and differences between our distinction and Ayer’s distinction we would have to focus
on three points; two of the points are differences between our distinction and Ayer’s
distinction while one of those points is a similarity between the two distinctions.

The major similarity between Ayer’s claim and our own is in the way both claims
will divide up the set of potential claims. As we have pointed out many times, for the set
of potential claims (excluding tautologies), our distinction and Ayer’s distinction will
divide up the claims into two identical sets.

That is, that the membership of our set of physical claims will be identical to the
membership of Ayer’s “meaningful claims”. Likewise the membership of our set of
non-physical claims will be identical to the membership of Ayer’s “meaningless claims”.
Of course, as we have noted many times, there is one way in which the membership of
our two sets will be different than the membership of Ayer’s two sets: tautologies.
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A quick side note: we will refer to this similarity, the one where Ayer divides up
potential claims into sets identical to our own, as ’ the “similarity of division” ‘13. N
 ow
back to the differences between Ayer’s distinction and our own distinction.

While we categorize tautologies as non-physical claims, Ayer categorizes
tautologies as meaningful, if trivially so, claims. It follows then that for tautological
claims, that we will not divide up the claims the same way as Ayer. While we otherwise
have said that the membership of the set of physical claims is identical to the
membership of the set of non-physical claims, that is untrue in the case of tautological
claims; tautological claims will be members of the set of Ayer’s meaningful claims yet
they will not be members of our set of physical claims.

So then, that we categorize tautological claims differently than Ayer categorizes
them is the first noteworthy difference between our distinction and Ayer’s distinctions. It
is one way in which the similarity of division doesn’t hold.

The second major difference between our distinction and Ayer’s distinction is, as
we have previously noted, Ayer categorizes all non-empirical claims as meaningless

13

This is done for simplicity's sake. We will reference this “similarity of division” a bunch and we don’t
want to say the full sentence “the similarity between the membership of the two sets produced by our
distinction’s division of claims and between the membership of the two sets produced by Ayer’s
distinction’s division of claims”, so for simplicity's sake we shorten things.
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while we don’t make any claims about the meaningfulness of physical claims14. Our
thesis isn’t about the kind of claims which are meaningful. We are totally neutral on the
meaningfulness of non-physical claims. We, unlike Ayer, allow for the possibility that
non-physical claims are meaningful although we make no commitments either way.

Now this is all well and good. As things stand now, our distinction is pretty similar
to Ayer’s. At the end of the day we mostly categorize claims the same way as Ayer.
Sure, we categorize tautological claims differently than Ayer categorizes them. Sure, we
allow for the possibility that non-physical claims are meaningful while Ayer does not. At
the end of the day though the fact remains that, with one exception (tautological claims),
Ayer’s distinction categorizes claims the same way as our distinction...or does it? To
this point we have been doing our best job to steelman the claim “Ayer’s distinction is
similar to our distinction”: as much as we can we have attempted to present the case
that our distinction is similar to Ayer’s distinction. Now that changes; we will begin to
distinguish Ayer’s claim from our own.

A summary of how we will further distinguish our claim from
Ayer’s claim.

14

In other words, Ayer holds that non-physical claims are meaningless; while we on the other hand make
no claims about the meaningfulness of non-physical claims.
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In what follows we’re going to have to go on a bit of a winding path, collecting a
couple of important premises, until eventually we have all the pieces we need. Once
we’ve organized our argument we will attack the major similarity between Ayer’s claim
and our own.

Let’s summarize what I am about to argue. My argument isn’t super complicated
at all but it requires looking at a handful of moving pieces (premises and arguments)
before any pay off. For that reason I’m giving this simple summary upfront; my hope is
that this initial summary will clarify why we are hopping around arguments which
seemingly don’t distinguish our claim from Ayer’s claim in any obvious way.

First let’s put things super simply. Our criterion divides up claims on the basis of
our ability to compare claims to the world. Ayer’s criterion divides up claims on the basis
of whether the claim can be used to better anticipate experience. To this point our
criterion has divided up claims identically to Ayer’s division of claims. However, that is
only because Ayer assumes that the scientific method is the best available method to
evaluate claims which anticipate experience. However, Ayer will concede that the best
available method is subjective and changes from person to person. In fact Ayer will
concede that there could in theory be some other method of evaluating empirical claims
15

which he would believe is superior to the scientific method .

15

Ayer says “We trust the methods of contemporary science because they have been successful in
practice. If in the future we were to adopt different methods, then beliefs which are now rational might
become irrational from the standpoint of these new methods.”(100). This implies that we trust science
because it has been the most successful method of producing empirical beliefs, but it is implied, were
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Putting things together, given that Ayer holds that empirical claims are ones
which allow us to anticipate experience, and given that he also holds that the best way
to anticipate experience is partially subjective, it will then follow that for certain methods
of evaluating anticipatory claims the division of possible claims will change: that is the
membership of this set of “empirical claims”, or “claims which are used to improve our
ability to anticipate experience”, the membership of the set of meaningful claims in
short, will change from person to person.

The consequence of the previous vague blob of words will be that the similarity of
division is contingent on a person believing that the scientific method (or something
approximating the scientific method) is the best way to evaluate empirical claims.
However one might believe that any number of methods are best for evaluating claims;
for some of those methods though the similarity of division will not hold. Ok, that was a
bunch. Let’s take a breath before explaining what we just said.

A closer look at the differences between Ayer’s claim and our own
claim.

there another empirical claim evaluating method, Ayer would concede that that method is preferable to
the scientific method.
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First, we need to clarify what Ayer means by (non-tautological) “meaningful
claims”, and “empirical claims”, and by all the many names Ayer uses to refer to the
category of meaningful non-tautological claims. Ayer mostly defines these empirical
claims as a claim which is more consistent with some potential sensory experience and
less consistent with some other potential sensory experiences. However, Ayer also
provides another necessary condition for membership as an “empirical claim”, that a
claim “enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations” (97).

First we need to explain how we know that Ayer holds that a necessary condition
for membership in “physical claim” is that a claim must in some way allow us to better
anticipate the course of our experience: that this, let’s call it, “potential anticipatory
utility” of a claim is a necessary condition for classification as an “empirical claim” isn’t
obvious and requires a closer reading. It’s not especially complicated but it requires us
to more closely examine Ayer piece by piece. What do we really mean by “empirical
claim”?

Now you might say that we already know what Ayer means with terms like
“empirical claims”. An empirical claim, you will remember, is any claim which is
consistent with some possible sensory experience but inconsistent with other possible
sensory experience: “Empirical propositions are one and all hypotheses, which may be
confirmed or discredited in actual sense-experience”(93-94). You would be right in
saying so; however, we will see that, at a deeper level, there is a more exact meaning to
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“empirical claim”. Ayer’s “empirical claim” is also a claim which allows us “to anticipate
the course of our sensations”(97). Let’s take a closer look.

Ayer says that “all propositions which have factual content are empirical
hypotheses; and that the function of an empirical hypothesis is to provide a rule for the
anticipation of experience. And this means that every empirical hypothesis must be
relevant to some actual, or possible, experience, so that a statement which is not
relevant to any experience is not an empirical hypothesis, and accordingly has no
factual content” (41). An essential feature o
 f an empirical hypothesis is that it provide a
rule for the anticipation of experience.

In short Ayer holds that every empirical claim must in some way allow us to
anticipate the course of our experience. That is, it a necessary condition for
membership as an empirical claim that a claim in some way allow us to anticipate the
course of our experience. Furthermore, not only is it a necessary condition for
membership as an empirical claim that a claim allow us to anticipate the course of our
experience, it is in fact the entire reason that we make empirical claims, “What is the
purpose of formulating hypotheses? Why do we construct these systems in the first
place? The answer is that they are designed to enable us to anticipate the course of our
sensations. The function of a system of hypotheses is to warn us beforehand what will
be our experience in a certain field—to enable us to make accurate predictions”(97).
Ayer continues ,“The hypotheses may therefore be described as rules which govern our
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expectation of future experience.”: that is when thinking about empirical hypothesis we
need only to think about which experiences they predict.

The point is, that it is a necessary condition of an empirical hypothesis that it
allow us to anticipate the course of our experiences. Now that we have established this
anticipatory criterion we need to take a closer look at the rules governing it. That is Ayer
provides rules for how to evaluate these hypothesis which govern the course of our
experience. Once we have those we can get to our point; that given the anticipatory
criterion, and given Ayer’s further rules for evaluating claims which allow us to anticipate
experiences, it will then follow that under certain conditions the classification of a claim’s
meaningfulness will change. But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. We still need to look
at Ayer’s rules for evaluating these anticipatory claims.

So we’ve established that this anticipatory criterion is a necessary condition of
empirical claims. Put differently, it is a necessary condition of an empirical claim that it,
in some way, enable us to determine what the probability of certain potential sensory
experiences will be.

But we require further explanation of this “probability”: “It is necessary now to
make clear what is meant in this context by the term ‘probability’”(99).
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Ayer continues by explaining the rules under which a claim can be used to
predict the probability of certain future sensory experiences. When Ayer speaks about
the probability of an empirical claim he means “Roughly speaking, all that we mean by
saying that an observation increases the probability of a proposition is that it increases
our confidence in the proposition, as measured by our willingness to rely on it in practice
as a forecast of our sensations and to retain it in preference to other hypotheses in face
of an unfavorable experience. And, similarly, to say of an observation that it diminishes
the probability of a proposition is to say that it decreases our willingness to include the
proposition in the system of accepted hypotheses which serve us as guides to the
future.”(100). So then when Ayer says that it is a necessary condition of an empirical
claim that it allow us to anticipate the course of experience, to figure out which sensory
experience is probable, he means that in the sense that there must be sensory
experience which makes us more or less willing to rely on the hypothesis to predict our
future experience.

But there is more, Ayer uses his concept of “rationality” to further explain what he
means by ‘probability’.

When Ayer speaks about the probability of a claim he means the probability in
the sense that we are likely to rely on the claim in the future. Furthermore when Ayer
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speaks about the probability of a claim he doesn’t only mean how likely we are to rely
on it to make predictions in the future. He means, how likely we are to rationally rely on
a claim to make predictions in the future. That is, by “probability” he means our
likelihood to rely on the claim to make predictions given the method which we consider
to be the most reliable method for predicting future experience. That is there are times
when we don’t use the best available methods to predict our future experience:
“Although we acknowledge that certain standards of evidence ought always to be
observed in the formation of our beliefs, we do not always observe them. In other
words, we are not always rational”(100). When Ayer says that the purpose of a claim is
to better assess the probability of future experience he means the probability of the
claim given that we use whichever hypothesis evaluating technique we consider to be
most reliable: the “rational” probability.

So then, grounding the last paragraph in the text, Ayer explains what he means
by the probability of a claim. He means the likelihood of the claim given our use of the
method for evaluating empirical claims which we consider to be most reliable, that is to
say “rational”: “To say that an observation increases the probability of a hypothesis is
not always equivalent to saying that it increases the degree of confidence with which we
actually entertain the hypothesis, as measured by our readiness to act upon it: for we
may be behaving irrationally. It is equivalent to saying that the observation increases the
degree of confidence with which it is rational to entertain the hypothesis .And here we
may repeat that the rationality of a belief is defined, not by reference to any absolute
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standard, but by reference to part of our own actual practice.” (100-101), and by rational
Ayer more clearly explains what he means “we define a rational belief as one which is
arrived at by the methods which we now consider reliable”(100).

Now, this is where things get interesting. I will now give an example where, given
what we have now said about rational probability, a claim will be meaningless while at
the same time being a physical claim. That is, we will show, that under certain
conditions there will be claims which we classify as physical claims but which Ayer will
classify as a non-physical claim. Remember that this is just a thought experiment. We
are certainly not claiming that the person in our thought experiment exists. We are
simply using a thought experiment to create a case where Ayer will, in certain
conditions, classify physical claims differently then we will classify them. The thought
experiment is itself far fetched and silly but that doesn’t matter.

Suppose a hypothetical person who believes that the most reliable method for
predicting certain kinds of future experience is by the purity/impurity of their past
thoughts. Let’s just suppose that we define purity and impurity using the Torah. So pure
thoughts are thoughts about Torah study and charity and things of that nature. Impure
thoughts are for example thoughts about certain kinds of bugs, and thoughts about
touching dead bodies. Let’s suppose he believes that the purity of his thoughts best
predicts all especially bad, and good things that happen to him.
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Now let’s consider a hypothetical case; a case with a hypothetical claim that
needs our categorization. We will present the case and then consider how the claim will
be categorized. That is, first we look at how we will categorize the claim, then how Ayer
would categorize the claim given his belief that the scientific method is “rational”, then
we will consider how Ayer would categorize the claim from the perspective of the person
in our thought experiment.

Let’s suppose that hypothetical person is using a rope to pull up a piano from the
sidewalk into their second-floor window. The rope breaks. The piano falls and breaks
into a hundred pieces. This upsets our hypothetical person and makes him feel very
bad, which of course makes him realize that it fell because he had an impure thought.
He doesn’t know which thought it was, but the piano wouldn’t have fallen if there had
been no thought so there must have been one. Down below on the street a person says
”the piano fell because the knot on the rope came apart unfurled and untied”. The claim
in question then is “the piano fell because the knot on the rope came apart unfurled
and untied”. Now, let’s consider how we will categorize the claim.

First we consider how we would categorize this claim. We would ask ourselves,
would we be able to distinguish a world where this claim is true from a world where the
claim is false? We would, of course, be able to distinguish a world where the claim is
true from a world where the claim is false. We could, for example, observe the knot at
the moments right before the piano fell. If for example a knot becomes undone then we
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would be in a world where the claim is true. If however, we observed that the knot did
not become undone but instead the rope ripped far away from the knot then we would
say that we are not in a world where the claim is true. So then, because we can
distinguish a world where the claim is true from a world where the claim is false, we will
say that this claim is a physical claim16.

Now we move onto Ayer’s criterion given his belief that the scientific method is
the most reliable method (rationale) for assessing claims like the one above. We need
only to ask ourselves whether there are sensory experiences that would make us more
or less likely to rely on this claim to predict future experience. The answer is of course
that there are such experiences. According to Ayer, who believes that the scientific
method is the most reliable way to predict experience, there are of course experiences
which can confirm or disconfirm the claim: we can at the very least observe the knot at
the point that it came apart and thus potentially make better predictions about knots in
the future. So then according to Ayer, given his subjective rationality, this claim will be a
meaningful claim.

So far so good. We say that the claim is physical, Ayer would say that the claim
is meaningful. Up until this point our criterion categorizes the claim identically to Ayer.
This is where things diverge. Let’s look at how Ayer would evaluate the claim relative to
our exemplar person’s most trusted method for anticipating experience.
16

Ignore any background assumption about causation, which we are certainly making. What matters here
is that the claim can be tested against experience. This will be true even if we are making some faulty
assumptions about the existence of causation.
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Our hypothetical person would say that the piano must have fallen because they
had an impure thought at some time in the past. He would say that the knot coming
apart had nothing to do with it. He would be puzzled in fact that we think the falling
piano had anything to do with the rope. That is, even if the knot had not come apart the
piano would have phased through the rope, made corporeal like the ghosts in Harry
Potter, and broken into one hundred pieces on the ground. That is the knot might have
come apart, it might not have come apart, but those things have no causal relation to
the piano falling down17.

Now would Ayer say that, relative to this person, the claim is meaningless? I
think so. According to Ayer a claim is meaningful only the case that some potential
sensory experience would confirm or disconfirm the truth value of the claim. However
for the claim “the piano fell because the knot on the rope came apart unfurled and
untied” there is no potential sensory experience which will confirm or disconfirm the
truth value of the claim. To our hypothetical person, the truth value of the claim cannot
be changed by some sensory experience. Because our hypothetical person believes
that reference to his past thoughts is the most reliable method for anticipating future
experience it follows that there is no sensory experience which can falsify/confirm the
claim in question. So then according to Ayer, for this person, the claim in question would
then be a meaningless claim.
17

Note that this is different than an auxiliary hypothesis; this standard under which the best way to predict
bad things is our hypothetical person’s most trusted way of predicting the future.
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What we have shown here is that our similarity with Ayer is contingent on the
method a person believes to be most reliable for anticipating experience. In the case
that a person who, like Ayer, believes that the best method for anticipating experience is
the scientific method, then Ayer’s criterion will indeed divide up non-tautological claims
the same way as we divide up those claims. However, for a person who uses other
methods to anticipate the course of their experience, such as our hypothetical person,
Ayer’s criterion will divide up non-tautological claims into sets which don’t perfectly
match the two sets produced by our criterion.

There is though one major question that remains. You might ask, how would we
assess our hypothetical claim relative to our hypothetical person. Would we also not say
that, relative to our hypothetical person, the claim is a non-physical claim? That is,
couldn’t the person say, given our criterion, that the hypothetical claim is not, given their
personal beliefs, a physical claim? I’m not sure. Let’s see.

The criterion for membership as a physical claim is that there must be something
in the world that can distinguish a world where the claim is true from a world where the
claim is false. Now our hypothetical person would say that we cannot distinguish a world
where the claim was true from a world where the claim was false. After all, our
hypothetical person believes, that in both worlds the piano was drawn down by past
impure thoughts and that the rope had nothing to do with it; that is the piano would have
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been drawn down even if it was suspended by steel cable; it would past through the
cable. So then it would seem to follow that the hypothetical person could perhaps say
that we cannot distinguish a world where the claim is true from a world where the claim
is false. How could we; the movement of the piano after all has nothing to do with any
knots?

Let us consider how we would analyze the claim. We would take the claim, “the
piano fell because the knot on the rope came apart unfurled and untied” to mean that in
a world where the knot came apart that the piano would fall but in the world where the
knot did not come apart the piano would not have fallen. Now, of course, the
hypothetical person could object and claim that the piano fell because of impure
thoughts. That has no bearing on the claim though. The claim is simply that in a world
where the knot was tied the piano would not have fallen but in a world where the knot
was not tied that the piano would have fallen. Now our claim might be totally misguided
but our claim is one which could in theory, if perhaps incorrectly, be tested against the
world. That our hypothetical person objects and proposes an alternative hypothesis has
no bearing on the claim itself. That, however, is uniquely not the case with Ayer. Prima
facie anyone would take the hypothetical claim to be about a testable claim; even if they
thought that the claim makes incorrect assumptions. Ayer though, with his further
criterion of rationality, prevents an everyday understanding of the claim in the case of
our hypothetical person. According to Ayer, we must evaluate empirical claims by our
own subjective standard, not simply by the content of the claim itself. So while the claim
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was about a testable, if perhaps incorrect from the perspective our hypothetical person,
empirical claim, Ayer will insist that our hypothetical person evaluate the claim, not on
the basis of what the claim itself says but by additionally using his own standards,
standards which then jeopardize the claims status as an empirical claim.

So then we have demonstrated is that in certain cases Ayer’s criterion will divide
up the set of non-tautological claims differently than our criterion would divide up the set
of claims. Sure our example was pretty far-fetched. We used a wacky example to test
the conceptual edges of Ayer’s case. Are there any less wacky cases which we could
have used instead of our very wacky case? I would assume so but I’m not sure.

Initially, the largest similarity between Ayer’s criterion and our criterion was that
the two criteria will divide up a set of non-tautological claims into two identical sets.
What have demonstrated in this chapter is that that similarity, what we have called the
“similarity of division”, is contingent on what one believes to be the most reliable method
of anticipating experience. Given certain possible subjectively trusted methods the
similarity of division will not hold and with that the main similarity between Ayer’s
criterion and our own will not hold.
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Chapter 5: review and further discussion.

We began the first chapter by introducing a distinction between two types of
claims: what we called “physical claims”, and “nonphysical claims”. That is claims such
that there will be a difference in the world corresponding to their truth value, and claims
such that there will not be a difference in the world corresponding to their truth value.
We used claim (1), the claim about the chair, as an example of a physical claim. We
used claim (2), the claim about the morality of killing puppies, as an example of a
nonphysical claim.

Also we noted that there were two other kinds of physical claims. There were (3),
claims about universal laws, such as claims about gravity. There was also (4), claims
which clearly had some exceptions, such as claims about conditioning in mammals. We
noted that for (3) and (4) that the conditions under which they are true was unclear and
as such it was unclear whether they met the conditions for membership as physical
claims. We put (3) and (4) aside. We would explain why (3) and (4) were physical
claims at a later point.

In the second chapter we introduced a major problem for our claim. We seemed
to be presuming the existence of a mind independent external world. To explain why we
were not presuming the existence of a mind independent external world we introduced
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Chalmers’s paper where he argued that, should it turn out that our reality is simulated, it
would not then follow that our reality isn’t real. We objected to some of Chalmers’s
claims about simulations, namely we argued that “being in a simulation” was not a
meaningful term. Eventually though we returned to our problem where we used
Chalmers’s argument to explain why our claim does not presume the existence of a
mind independent external world. We resolved our problem.

In the third chapter we introduced Ayer. We noted a major similarity between
Ayer’s distinction between meaningful/meaningless claims and our distinction between
physical/nonphysical claims, namely that we both divided up non-tautological claims into
two identical sets. We called this similarity the “similarity of division”.

We used the proverb about a tree falling in the forest when no one is around to
hear, to see whether we would classify such a claim the same way as Ayer would
classify it and in the end we determined that we would both classify the claim the same
way.

We then introduced Ayer’s loose verificationist principle, which we agreed with,
and then used the loose verificationist principle to explain why (3) and (4) were in fact
physical claims. Whereas we had initially thought that (3) and (4) were, unlike (1),
unique in not having clear truth conditions, we realized that no physical claims have
perfectly clear truth conditions. We added a nuance to our claim. When we speak about
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distinguishing between a world where a claim is true and world where claim is false, we
merely mean to distinguish between a world where the claim is likely to be true and
between a world where the claim is likely to be false. In light of this added nuance our
issue with (3) and (4) disappeared. Both (3) and (4) are physical claims because we can
distinguish between worlds where the claims are more or less likely to be true.

In the fourth chapter we begin to distinguish our claim from Ayer’s claim. We
introduce Ayer’s anticipatory criterion and with it Ayer’s rational probability. Given then
Ayer’s usage of probability, we presented a hypothetical case where Ayer would
categorize as a nontautological claim differently than we would categorize that claim. In
doing so we demonstrated that the similarity of division does not hold.

Further discussion

There are some other ways that we might potentially distinguish Ayer’s distinction
from our own. For example how would we classify claims in written fiction? How would
we classify a case where a fictional person says that “there is a chair over there”? Now
you might think that we have done exactly that in all of our examples. In all of our
examples, however, we were proposing hypothetical claims and acting as if a real
person said it.
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Let’s go a step further. Suppose a claim about a certain chairs location in
Wonderland. That is a claim about a chair in a place that only exists in fiction. Would
Ayer say that the claim is meaningless because we cannot predict any sensory
experience? Would Ayer say that the claim is meaningful because we can use the claim
to predict the sensory experience of seeing other words in the book; that is we can
predict which letters we will see later in the book on the basis of the chairs location. For
example we might predict that we will see words like “he sat down on the chair”. It’s not
clear to me how Ayer would classify such a claim. Ayer does hold that poetry is often
meaningful but it’s not clear if poetry is totally fictional. I can think of a couple of different
kinds of claims that could be made in fiction but for which I have no idea how Ayer
would categorize them18; I’m not even sure how we would categorize them.

18

For example suppose a fictional person who says that there is a chair at a certain real location, like
New Jersey for instance. Perhaps that claim is meaningful because we can in fact check if there is a chair
in the non-fictional New Jersey.
But suppose then a fictional character in a fictional world much like our own save that this fictional world
has an 8th continent. Suppose that this fictional character says that there is a chair on the 8th continent.
We might say that this claim is meaningless because there is no such continent in real life which would
allow us to test the claim. We might say that the claim is meaningful because there could in theory be
such a continent and we would then be able test the claim. We might say that the claim is meaningful
because the existence of the continent is itself a testable part of the claim; we can test the claim by first
checking if there is an 8th continent. We might even say that the claim is meaningful even though we
can’t check the claim because the fictional character could check the claim in his fictional world. We might
say that the claim is meaningful because we ourselves can in fact check if the claim is true. For example
in the case that all the fictional characters agree that there is no such chair we might say that the claim is
likely false. So then were we in fact able to test the claim?
We could also suppose a fictional world which is exactly like our own world save for the fact that we never
exist. Would claims made in this world be meaningful? We might say that claims made in this world are
meaningless because we can never test them. But Ayer does say that claims about past events are
meaningful even though we seemingly can’t test them. Can we test claims about the past though? Some
certainly but not all of them. So on and so forth. The point is that this discussion of claims made in fiction
introduces many questions.
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Also our treatment of Chalmers was a bit superficial. We set the table for a
discussion but didn’t really get into it. We didn’t discuss the implications of our claim that
“being inside of a simulation” is a meaningless phrase; for instance does it follow then
that aren’t any simulations? I don’t think so. At the same time how can we say that there
can be simulations but that being inside of a simulation doesn’t mean anything? I’m not
sure.

Reflecting now on the project I might have done a couple of things differently. I
think that the part of the paper where we use Chalmers to explain why we don’t assume
the existence of a mind independent external world was too sloppy; while I think that
that solution was elegant I don’t think that the reasoning was explicit enough.

Also I might have liked to connect Ayer to something called “predictive
processing”. The basic idea of predictive processing it to think of the human brain as a
prediction machine. Ayer seems to suggest something very broadly along those lines, “
The hypotheses may therefore be described as rules which govern our expectation of
future experience. There is no need to say why we require such rules. It is plain that on
our ability to make successful predictions depends the satisfaction of even our simplest
desires. including the desire to survive.”(97): Ayer seems to be suggesting that
predictions are our essential tool for interacting with the world. Predictive processing, if
it’s claims were true, would seem to support Ayer’s emphasis on the importance of a
claims predictive content.
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The problem is that predictive processing doesn’t really predict much. It’s
“postdicts” a lot but is currently pretty light on falsifiable predictions. I’m not sure if it
really should predict much though. Perhaps it’s just a simple way to organize many
varying scientific claims under a single framework with far fewer assumptions. While
writing this paper predictive processing was one of the main things I was thinking about
but I can’t really tell if it’s some huge insight or bad, that is to say totally unfalsifiable,
science.

We might also have spent more time discussing Ayer’s view of meaning. Ayer
says pretty much that for a claim to be meaningful there must be some way to test it’s
truth value. We can determine the truth value of tautologies and empirical claims so
they are meaningful. But why must we be able to determine a claims truth value for the
claim to be meaningful? I have some vague intuitions on the answer to this question but
I still feel like I might be missing something here.
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